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ABSTRACT
Using the travels of Hassoldt Davis in Ivory Coast to explore the global Cold War in French West Africa in the 1950s, this article argues that the main line of confrontation in the postwar era did not always pit Americans against Russians. In many instances, the struggle for the mind and soul of Africans was between the Americans and the French. The study highlights the role of everyday technology in the expansion of the American informal empire. By focusing on Davis and the significance of low-tech artifacts, the article suggests that in our scrutiny of Cold War science/technology, we need to supplement the study of the various production regimes of consumer goods with a comparable research on consumption and how they mediated the daily battles of the era. Such approach not only underscores the historical reality of the ‘social life of things’, but also gives agency to non-state actors as both users of Cold War technoscience and as participants in the politics that informed its mobilization on the world stage. Besides bringing Francophone Africa in the historiography of US–Africa relations, the article demonstrates a convergence of vision among American consular agents, US transnational corporations and an idiosyncratic travel writer.

KEYWORDS
Hassoldt Davis; Ivory Coast; cold war; low-tech artifacts; US informal empire

Introduction
Assessing a couple of years ago the growing historical literature on American involvement in the various imperial (dis)entanglements in the aftermath of the Second World War, historian Martin Thomas concluded that there was little indication that ‘the eight French-speaking colonies of sub-Saharan western Africa have generated much interest among historians of post-war American foreign policy’. While he was reluctant to dispute the ‘lowly standing’ of West Africa in the actual conduct of US diplomacy during the postwar years, Thomas was adamant in arguing that the United States was ‘no mere passive observer of events’. The British scholar could not be less on target in his assessment. The historiography of US foreign relations with Africa in the twentieth-century has indeed largely focused on American dealings with Angophone (and sometimes, Lusophone) regions. If earlier works explored US involvements in various (geo)political imbiblios in Southern Africa, more recent studies have expanded this political geography to include Washington’s relations with such countries as Ghana, Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya. At the
same time, the issues of race, culture and American investment in processes of decolonization and development in Africa have received a new lease of life.²

Francophone West Africa has remained, however, understudied in the scholarship on US–Africa relations. With few exceptions, the analyses of historians continue to focus on other regions of the continent.³ Yet, much could be gained if Africa’s French-speaking countries were brought into the frame of this historical literature. First, the inclusion has the potential to test the validity of the general conclusions that historians have developed with regard to American presence in Africa. Moreover, it will help challenge the quite perceptive, if at times narrowly framed, historiographical school of Françafrique that narrates the story of Francophone Africa’s external relations in terms of exclusive Franco–African rapports.⁴

While mindful of the insights of Françafrique scholarship, the current article zeroes in on American presence in a single territory in French-speaking West Africa. It aims to extend some of the efforts of an emerging scholarship that is revising old certainties to provide a sharper outline for the historiography of American foreign affairs in the region. Expanding on the range of sources and actors usually analyzed in the histories of US–Africa relations, it partly focuses on the activities of American amateur ethnographer and travel writer Hassoldt Davis who, together with his wife Ruth Staudinger Davis, toured Ivory Coast in the early to mid-1950s and left written and cinematic chronicles of their peregrinations.⁵ While few scholars have paid attention to this man, the article suggests that Davis’s ideas and attitudes – at least, as revealed through his travelogue and unpublished papers – are a good refraction of the views of many American transnational actors who had come to doubt the emancipatory power of European civilizing missions in the decades that followed the Second World War.⁶ In fact, within the context of heightened post-war nationalism in the colonies, an incipient global Cold War politics, and the expansion of what Henry Luce had called the American Century, many observers in the United States thought that only American leadership and activism could save the world.⁷

American diplomats were certainly working hard to realize this vision – a point I flesh out in the article. Even more, I argue that Davis’s activities in the early 1950s echo the postures of US officials and show that some Americans operated diligently in an attempt to displace European colonial rule with what they posed as US-style modernity and consumer culture. Such a claim surely echoes some of the arguments that historians John Kent and David Gibbs have suggested in their respective scrutiny of US foreign policymaking in late colonial Africa.⁸ Unlike many of their characters, however, the self-appointed cold warrior Hassoldt Davis was at the same time a Francophile, a critic of French colonialism and a zealous apostle of the spread of American-style modernity. The evidence that we have right now does not allow us to claim that he was an agent of the American Cold War bureaucracy. But his actions were in line with the Cold War mindset of this period. An intrepid roving, if unofficial, US ambassador, Davis also had come to believe, like some of his Ivorian informants, that ‘Whiteman’s magic’, that is, Euro-American technology, was not only ‘mightier than Marx’, but also that its effective use promised victory over ubiquitous communist agitators in Ivory Coast and probably beyond.⁹

That technoscientific artifacts were deployed to wage the global Cold War should not come as a surprise. After all, many Cold War episodes entailed the mobilization of high science and technology to advance the goals of the respective superpowers. A good deal of the Cold War historiography has explored this theme as their authors appropriately
redirect our scholarly attention away from purely geopolitical considerations. In addition to contributing to this reorientation, what is most intriguing about the Davis story and begs further critical consideration is how it complicates the conventional lines of Cold War confrontations, shifting the showdown from a US–Soviet technological rivalry to a Franco-American clash over how to best respond to the seeming infiltration of communist ideas among colonial subjects and nationalists in French West Africa. What is more, Davis’s travelogue urges researchers to reorient their attention from the regimes of production of ‘big’ technoscience. Only then can we critically map out the routine and dynamic values at work in the mediation and consumption of small-scale technoscientific commodities during the Cold War. For if historian David Arnold is right that mapping the everyday life of low-tech machines (cf. transistors, can openers, flashlights ...) is more meaningful for a deeper understanding of modernity, then Davis’s deployment of American small-scale gadgets to fight communism becomes a vehicle to explore science as a means to win the Cold War and thus spread American modernity and consumer culture.

Ivory Coast, the physical setting where this unusual Cold War saga took place, was hardly a blank space in America’s imperial or market geography of West Africa. Due to its proximity to the American Colonization Society’s settlements of Liberia, New England trade vessels had plied the western shores of the territory during the early decades of the nineteenth-century. By the middle of the century, trading relations between American merchants and the local communities on the coast were regular enough to require the presence of a US naval squadron to ensure, in the words of a contemporary American officer, the ‘safety of commerce and the general welfare of the world’. Although much of the area subsequently came under French influence, the territory remained an attractive market for American products, especially for rum and tobacco – two US commodities that the West Africans apparently appreciated. While the consolidation of France’s colonial rule in 1893 reduced the American commercial presence in Ivory Coast, French colonial neomercantilism (pacte colonial) did not stop US–Ivorian trade. At most, it altered the category of goods that were traded between the two regions. By the middle of the twentieth-century, not only did a third of Ivorian imports outside the Franc zone come from the United States, but a high percentage of such imported goods consisted of cars, trucks, machines and other technoscientific gadgets – commodities that were ever more dominating US exports to the world as a whole.

To be sure, the prime consumers of these products were the minority of white colonists in the territory who, like their compatriots in metropolitan France, used the imported low-tech machines to enact their modernity, distance themselves from the local population, and thus reaffirm the boundaries of colonial distinction. In a sense, it was this type of racist bourgeois practice of low-tech commodity consumption that Hassoldt Davis disputed. At a moment when leftist recruiters were reportedly gaining converts in droves, the American explorer ruled that ‘everyday technology’ should rather be deployed democratically. This supposedly would assist in the fight against global communism, and, if need be, expand the reach of American industrial products. More insightfully, the vision of Davis to widen the realm of the informal empire of American consumer goods resonated with the thinking of some of the American diplomats in French West Africa who, as part of their general effort to entrench US position in the region, were calling for an increase in US presence and the market share of American products. As we shall see later, the negotiations for the opening of an American consulate in Ivory Coast in the
1950s highlighted this point. It further underpins that Hassoldt Davis’s Ivorian trip mirrored larger transformations in US foreign policy-making in the region – subtle shifts that are best encapsulated by the notion of the deliberate projection of American soft power. Before we explore the contours of these changes any further, however, it might be apposite to paint a portrait of Davis and his Ivorian expedition. Such a picture will allow us to highlight how the idiosyncrasies of one American man could be a window into the American way of empire – what historian Victoria de Grazia calls ‘an informal empire, with its outright colonial adventures aberrant, circumscribed, and generally short-lived’. In an age of decolonization, indeed, the travels of Davis crystalized the workings of that ‘irresistible empire’.

Figure 1. Summary itinerary of the Davis Expedition in Ivory Coast. Cartography by Abou B. Bamba.
Davis and the peregrinations of an unconventional cold warrior

Born in 1907 into a wealthy Boston family, Hassoldt Davis was perhaps the last incarnation of those rich young men who endlessly suffer from pathological boredom for lack of outlets to expend their frustrated masculinity. In such a condition, only amateur poetry and the reading of Tarzan books provided him with an escape into an imaginary world of romance and manhood. The exotic adventures of Tarzan were to have a lasting influence on the young Davis. At 32, the Bostonian curtailed his education, leaving Harvard College to escape to Tahiti, and later joining the Denis–Roosevelt expedition to Asia as both writer and photographer. This experience inspired him to write *Land of the Eye* and *Nepal, Land of Mystery*, both of which would be well received. At the outbreak of the Second World War, the adventure-oriented Davis volunteered to help General Charles de Gaulle’s Free France. In order to achieve this goal, the Bostonian now turned New Yorker, boarded a steamer *en route* for the French Congo whence he joined General Jacques-Philippe Leclerc and his troops in Chad as the Free French forces readied themselves to fight the Italians in North Africa. His participation in the war won Davis both the French *Croix de Guerre* and later his other services to the French government would earn him the prestigious *Légion d’Honneur*.

Even more rewarding than these mere honorific titles was the writer-explorer’s encounter with Kouamé Adingra – a Brong prince who, after fleeing the Vichy-controlled Ivory Coast, had joined General Leclerc’s forces in Chad. The fortuitous encounter was to facilitate Davis’s second major expedition after the war. An inveterate traveler, Davis was also a prolific writer. His stories, if sometimes contrived and voyeuristic, always had the touch of both the amateur ethnographer and the *poète manqué* (unfulfilled poet). Already in 1952 he had published the favorably received *The Jungle and the Damned*, an account of his expedition to French Guiana. Acting sometimes as a literary critic himself, Davis also regularly contributed to the *New York Times*.

It was this experienced explorer and writer who arrived in Ivory Coast in late 1949. Accompanied by his wife Ruth – a former photographer for the French Information Service in New York – the Francophile couple planned not only to find a village where sorcerers and witches were supposedly trained but also to unveil the mystery surrounding the custom among the Yakuba people of Yho (western Ivory Coast) in which a ‘king of the Dance is elected annually and killed at the end of his term with a golden arrow’. The Davises’ experiences in various Ivorian outposts (*Figure 1*) provided the foundation for the publication of *Sorcerers’ Village*, which included numerous photographs by Ruth Davis.

The least to say is that *Sorcerers’ Village* is replete with oxymora. The book opens with a preface in which Hassoldt Davis extends his gratitude to the French officials who helped plan his trip, including Governor Laurent Pechoux, the Chargeurs Reunis, the Compagnie de Transports Océaniques and Ambassador Henri Bonnet. However, the travelogue soon reveals and delves into many instances in which the French colonists appear weak, if not effeminate cold warriors, soon to be replaced by the stronger and more efficient Americans. Not only was the French civilizing mission incapable of uprooting cannibalism among the so-called backward indigenous people, but more troubling in Davis’s account was the fact that the French colonial authorities proved unable to contain the spread of communism in the territory. In fact, the explorer seems to fault the inept French for turning the alleged communists...
into an omnipresent threat with their mythical leadership going ‘everywhere, but everywhere […]’ to make more trouble.\(^{27}\)

One such trouble-making instance occurred in the district of Tiébissou in the center of the territory where the communists had reportedly rebelled against the authorities and assaulted a number of district guards.\(^{28}\) While the local district commissioner (\textit{commandant de cercle}) eventually rounded up the rebellious communists and forced them to apologize and renounce their subversive faith, agitation did not end. In fact, the communists organized a rally in the nearby district of Toumodi soon thereafter.\(^{29}\) With the French displaying yet more signs of weakness, it was only the assistance of Davis and his Lambretta scooter (symbol of European, if American-driven, modernity) that allowed the authorities to monitor the recalcitrant communists.\(^{30}\) What this episode confirmed then was that Hassoldt Davis, as a self-styled American cold warrior, never doubted the power of machines as a more powerful tool to contain the perceived expansion of communism. This confidence, he substantiated it with his use of American technoscientific goods such as canned foods, radio and voice recorder to lure the seemingly credulous natives away from the communists and their nefarious ideology.\(^{31}\) It is as if where the French imperialists had failed to uplift the Ivorians from both material ‘backwardness’ and dearth, Davis promised – in the words of Nils Gilman – to ‘exorcise the secular demons of the postwar world – poverty, Communism, and colonialism’. Like the officially anointed American modernizers, he had armed himself with ‘sacramental science and technology’ to meet the challenge of the restive French colonial subjects of Ivory Coast.\(^{32}\)

In truth, \textit{Sorcerers’ Village} reads like a surreal story, especially for anyone familiar with the protracted nationalist politics of postwar French West Africa. There were certainly a lot of agitations in Ivory Coast in the late 1940s and early 1950s – a point that a body of sound historical works has long confirmed.\(^{33}\) But Davis’s fantastic narrative of native agitation raises serious questions: How, for instance, could one person (be they American or otherwise) defeat such a mighty and well organized group as the communist militants and their sympathizers in French-rulled Ivory Coast? How did the so-called communist agitators react to the ubiquitous presence of the Davises in the territory? Why didn’t they attack them, especially if, as Governor Péchoux reportedly claimed, they were ‘solely anti-whiteman’?\(^{34}\) It is hard to answer these questions. And, in the absence of answers, one can legitimately cast doubt on numerous aspects of the Davi- sian account, especially its allusion to the disarming power of American gadgetry on the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA) sympathizers and their abandonment of communism. All the more so since the \textit{New York Times}, in one of its reports on the peregrinations of the Davises, highlighted economic motivations in explaining the end of the romance between the communists and the natives in the interior of Ivory Coast.\(^{35}\)

The limitations of \textit{Sorcerers’ Village} notwithstanding, Hassoldt Davis’s travelogue is a privileged window that allows us to see how some Americans constructed the Cold War not only as a struggle to win the loyalty of the ‘wretched of the earth’ (Frantz Fanon) but also as an opportunity to replace the civilizing mission of the European powers. It was a dual effort not only to limit the appeal of communism, but also to update and even substitute European colonialism with a distinctively American technopolitical regime that promised material redemption for the colonial subjects.\(^{36}\)
The story of native mobilization against French colonialism in Ivory Coast was much more complex, though. For one, the Ivorians never were the passive victims of communism and colonialism that the Davises and other American outsiders assumed they had to liberate. Like other colonial subjects, the Ivorians tried various approaches in their quest for emancipation and the search for the good life. A critical return to the reasons why nationalist politicians and activists came to embrace communist-style agitation in French West Africa should clarify this point. At the same time, it will let us better appreciate the social and diplomatic contexts in which French colonial administrators, American consular agents and anti-colonial Ivorian activists operated.

Enacting a cold war politics in late colonial Ivory Coast

The Ivory Coast that Hassoldt Davis visited was a different place than the territory that another American couple toured a few decades earlier when French imperialism was at its zenith.37 The Second World War and the new international order that emerged in its wake had both altered imperial arrangements and fired up the imaginations of those who were calling for decolonization. In a context of multi-prong pressures from the colonies and transnational activism worldwide, the postwar French authorities allowed Africans to create trade unions and political parties. In addition to abolishing forced labor, franchise and citizenship were also expanded. These measures were to have shattering legacies. Now that they were citizens of the French Union (as the French empire came to be known in 1946), Africans could voice their opinions through organized labor, newspaper publishing or rallies and even send representatives to the French national assembly.38 To take full advantage of this new conjuncture, political training for African leaders and activists emerged as an urgent task. In cities and provincial towns, the educated elite attended informal course sessions and/or workshops on political ideas and the practical ways of organizing the masses – extramural educational activities to which metropolitan leftist civil servants on post in the region contributed enormously. It was from these training sessions that the members of the interterritorial political movement, the RDA, adopted their Marxist-inspired tactics that helped them better mobilize the masses and out-compete other political organizations. And when the time came for RDA’s elected parliamentarians to strike an alliance with metropolitan political parties at the Bourbon Palace (French National Assembly), they naturally gravitated toward the French Communist Party (PCF).39

Historians of French West Africa have long scrutinized the nature of the ideological orientation of the RDA, especially in the context of the anti-colonial agitations of the mid-1940s and 1950s. Most of these scholars agree that the organization was primarily agitating for decolonization – even though the very meaning of decolonization remained contested among various members of the movement.40 French officials thought otherwise. Although ultimately never proven, they ‘were convinced that many Africans organized in the RDA were manipulated by the French Communist Party and controlled from Paris’. According to historian Alexander Keese, some of those officials went as far as to hold that ‘the African party leaders were under strict orders “from Moscow”, transmitted via the French capital’.41 In reality, it was practical considerations that had led the RDA to strike an alliance with the PCF. As Tony Chafer has shown in his history of decolonization in French West Africa, when the RDA parliamentarians were elected to the French National Assembly, they ‘were not sufficiently numerous to form a separate parliamentary group.
In need of an alliance in order to maximize their effectiveness, they decided to affiliate to the Communist Party. In an imperial context dominated by paranoia over the war in Vietnam, authorities might have concluded that RDA was up to a communist revolution. But as Chafer emphasizes, the leaders of RDA ‘were not communists and [their] decision did not reflect [any] ideological position’.42

It is doubtful that the American diplomats and intelligence services dealing with French-ruled Africa were not aware of these specific developments. They had kept track of the activities of various nationalist movements in French West Africa. This was especially the case with RDA’s Ivorian branch – the Parti Démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI), which had been quite active between 1946 and 1950 and thus had garnered a lot of attention in the media.43 In early 1948, for instance, a consular report from Dakar accused Ivory Coast’s leading political party of fomenting discontent among the population. As a consequence, the dispatch continued, ‘economic conditions […] have noticeably deteriorated’.44 A year later, a report of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) revealed that although there was a similarity of view between RDA and communism, the African political organization could not be said to be subservient to Moscow. All RDA wanted was ‘full equality and social improvement for the Africans’.45 Despite this attempt at distinguishing between the citizenship yearnings of the Africans and their embrace of communism, another CIA internal document observed in March 1950 that Ivory Coast was the main focus of ‘organized Communist activity’ in French West Africa.46

At best, the reports of the intelligence services were thus contradictory. In Washington, however, some of the more influential members of the US foreign policy elite were tactfully appropriating the CIA’s latest line of interpretation of events in French West Africa to further their own agenda. Their first impulse was to request appropriations from the US Congress in a view toward opening new legations in Africa, including a consular post in the Ivorian capital. This was cannily proposed in 1951.47 In justifying such request, Deputy Assistant Secretary Burton Y. Berry stated before a commission of the Congress that his Department’s information was that a ‘Communist-front party has its stronghold in Abidjan. From there it infiltrates members through Black Africa, going even to Leopoldville’.48 Elaborating on this point, the diplomat further explained: ‘On the belief that infiltration does exist and is a potential danger, we would like to know a great deal more about it than we do, and a great deal more than we can know from our present listening posts’.49

The discussions between Berry and the House Appropriations Committee might have remained buried in the Congressional records had it not been for a front page coverage in Le Monde, which provoked the French decision-makers into action – an entanglement that confirms that, in the Cold War context (and probably beyond it), the media and other non-state actors remained significant protagonists in the complex relationships between the United States, France and its empire.50 Relaying the request of the State Department to their audience, the French newspaper reported that the United States was considering opening a Consulate General in Abidjan so as to ‘monitor’ the subversive activities of communists. Amplifying the terms of Berry’s congressional appearance, Le Monde pointed out that communist organizers were allegedly using Ivory Coast as a base to destabilize the entire West African region.51

More discomfited than alarmed by the journalistic revelation, French colonial authorities in West Africa undertook their own investigation. They concluded, however, that the United States ultimately had ‘commercial motives’ in calling for the opening of a consular
Thus, when the American request eventually arrived at the Quai d’Orsay in the spring of 1951, it was promptly denied. Notwithstanding the vogue of American bashing in France in the 1950s, the justification that the officials in Paris put forward to reject the proposed opening of a US legation in Ivory Coast should not be brushed aside lightly, especially given the timing of the American request, which occurred after both the disaffiliation of the RDA with the French communists and the inauguration of the deep-sea port of Abidjan, the completion of which had been aided by US tax money.

Although RDA’s Ivorian branch still exerted a tremendous appeal among the population, the crackdown that Governor Laurent Pèchoux began when he took office in 1948 was starting to bear some encouraging results. Besides the all too familiar tactic of intimidating PDCI sympathizers, pèchoutage (as the governor’s harsh method was later dubbed) used the event of urban riots in 1949 to ‘adopt strict measures’ against the leadership of the party, going as far as to imprison many of its field secretaries. Such unchecked frontal attack on PDCI members caused some cracks within RDA ranks. This was all the more possible since the PCF, which was a key member in the postwar coalition government in France, had parted ways with its metropolitan governing allies, leaving its African partner vulnerable to intimidation. Ultimately, as a CIA assessment revealed, the Pèchoux measures proved consequential, since not only did they lead to PDCI membership to decline, but more dramatically RDA’s president, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, disaffiliated in May 1950 his organization from the French Communist Party.

Admittedly, pèchoutage did not annihilate RDA’s Ivorian branch entirely. But, in the eyes of the American diplomats in Dakar, the governor’s ‘handling of the communistic uprising in the Ivory Coast’ was said to have ‘probably destroyed considerable of the strength of this communistic movement in that country’. Indeed, unlike in the neighboring Guinea where the intimidation of the colonial state reinforced the control of the left-wing of the party in the long run, Pèchoux and his methods in Ivory Coast paved the way for the realignment of PDCI’s actions and tactics. This new deal ushered in a period of productive, if ambiguous, collaboration with the colonial administration in Abidjan.

In light of this development, American foreign policy bureaucrats might have exaggerated the communist threat when they requested to open a legation in Ivory Coast. What was at stake appears to have been the expansion of the consular service network in an effort to attend to the increased importance of Ivory Coast for American businesses. This is supported by an American consular note intended for the State Department that argued in early August 1950 that ‘It would be highly useful if we could announce the opening of a Consulate at Abidjan in connection with the new importance which that port will have when the [Vridi] canal has been fully opened to ocean-going traffic.’ Despite this fact, it bears emphasizing that the very use of the specter of communist subversion as a bogeyman to prompt Congress into action reflected a real, if at times misguided, concern among American policy-making elite – a point that historians have highlighted in other contexts.

As a perceptive correspondent of the Manchester Guardian noted at the time, the plan to open a listening post in Abidjan had other implications. In a rather subtle way, it inadvertently pointed out that some American diplomats increasingly doubted the capacity or the will of the French authorities to effectively deal with communism. In the metropole itself, such doubts on the ability of the French to curb communist agitations had led the US agents to break the most elementary rules of diplomatic decorum.
shown, the activities of Hassoldt Davis in Ivory Coast brought to light similar issues regarding the global Cold War. There is, however, more to the Davis story that needs further elaboration. Indeed, if anything, the actions of the Davises in Ivorian territory suggested that some Americans readily believed in the expansion of a consumerist ethics as the surest antidote to the growth of Soviet influence in the postwar world. Scholars have persuasively demonstrated this in the case of metropolitan France. The travels of the Davises allow us to see how this played out in a colonial context.  

**Promoting an American consumer ethics in postwar Ivory Coast?**

As one critical reviewer of the movie version of the opus put it, there is little doubt that the value of Hassoldt Davis’s ethnographic work on Ivory Coast is overwhelmingly disputable. A similar assessment could validly be made about the book that came out of the expedition. Yet, while the ethnography in *Sorcerers’ Village* was ‘more diverting than memorable’, the significance of the book lay beyond the rather modest artistic qualities of Davis’s travelogue. This is so because travel writing, taken as a literary and cinematic genre, is as much about accumulating knowledge as it is about extending the disciplinary gaze of the empire. In this light, Hassoldt Davis may well have been a poor ethnographer, but he must be held as an agent *par excellence* of the US imperial drive in postwar Ivory Coast, an operative not unlike the official American consular agents. A careful re-reading of the narrative of Davis’s travel throughout the West African country underscores this clearly since it reveals the Davises to be in the vanguard of extending the reach of America’s capitalist and consumer modernity in French West Africa. And this was largely to the detriment of French colonial interests.

A quick reading of *Sorcerers’ Village* might lead one to summarily conclude that Davis was yet another American sympathetic subscriber to French colonialism, especially since the explorer’s first informant was none other than the local representative of the Institut Français d’Afrique Noire (IFAN) – a research organization that acted as one of the key players in the construction, circulation and institutionalization of French Africanist discourse during the colonial era. However, Davis’s visit to IFAN’s local office in Abidjan might best be seen as a means of strategically tapping information to design the contour of his planned trip. Thus, as the expedition party set off for the interior of Ivory Coast and gradually moved away from the French-style city of Abidjan, it soon appeared that besides the logistical aid of the French colonial authorities, the major forces that would help Davis in completing his exploration were American small-scale machines and consumer products such as flashlights, Coleman lanterns, radio sets, canned foods and the like. He would use American consumer goods not only to nourish his body, but also deployed them to shield himself from attack. For instance, he reportedly used his hotshot (a device also known as cattle prod that carries current at its ‘shock end’) to subdue unruly native peoples whenever he felt threatened by their presence. ‘My electric bull-prod [was] charged with three common flashlight batteries and shaped liked a thick cane’, the American reminisced in his travelogue. It ‘was the greatest defensive tool for close-up work I ever used. It emitted a shock that made bulls go happily to the butcher’s kindlier mallet, and made drunken natives sober up so cold they could freeze you at a glance’.  

Insightful in showcasing the literal and/or metaphorical power of low-tech gadgets, Davis stressed that he repeatedly mobilized American technoculture to keep recalcitrant
agitators in check. He also used gadgets to lure the native populations who had apparently remained impervious to the French *mission civilisatrice*. In one instance, where a ‘communist’ agitator – presumably an RDA activist – was to speak during a rally in South Central Ivory Coast, Davis plotted with his wife to derail the plan. His elaboration is worth quoting at length because it indexes the clout that the American traveler assigned to low-tech machines: ‘All right, baby. We’re going to cause a distraction. We are going to ride round and round the market place on the scooters’. Although Davis believed that ‘these gentlemen don’t prefer blondes,’ he sensed that ‘they will be fascinated by our funny scooters and pay more attention to us’.

As anticipated, the spectacle of the scooter was ‘not to be ignored’. In fact, as soon as the Davises began to implement their plan, ‘Heads turned toward us and our ludicrous but fantastically potent machines. Children followed us. We stopped to give lifts to some of them, and that brought cheers from the crowd, whose backs were to the agitator.

In another episode, villagers in the sorcerer’s heartland were made to witness the power of American gadgetry. After days during which the Davises had been shunned by the local population, the ingenuity of US technoscience won the natives over: ‘I believe it was the Hotcan which brought them to us first’, Davis wrote. Noting emphatically, he added: ‘The Hotcan is a most remarkable American product. You can buy it with various foods, solid or liquid, in it, and it is self-heating. It is a double can, really, with food in the center’. To underscore the low-tech and mundane nature of the product’s working principle, Davis offered: ‘You make a hole in it, invert it, and within ten minutes when the water of one compartment has mixed with the magic chemicals, it becomes boiling hot and steam gushes forth without recourse to any exterior flame. Then you open it with a simple can-opener and eat a delectable hot meal.

The Davises had used the canned food ‘for quick lunches in the truck, without stopping’. For the villagers, however, ‘it was tinned magic’, which the American quickly mobilized to his advantage: ‘When the chief and the chief sorcerer, having heard of it through their spies, came to call, I punctured a couple of tins of beef stew for them and passed them the cans to hold’. As expected, the cans ‘heated within ten seconds, they were burning off their paper labels in fifteen, and were dropped to the ground as the chief and the chief sorcerer hopped about, waving their burning hands, and fortunately, laughing at this miracle.

It was inventions such as this and many others that allegedly helped Davis convince the restive villagers of Ivory Coast to follow the American lead. One does not have to believe in all the rather tall tales that the traveler reported. But from the standpoint of archival research, it is clear that many contemporary Americans did trust the power of the low-tech gadgets in a world at large. In fact, anticipating the marketing possibilities that an African expedition might offer for their global expansion, American firms had contributed to the funding of Davis’s voyage to French West Africa. For instance, in response to the explorer’s request for donation – which it granted, the Borden Company demanded in return that Davis provided negatives to be displayed in ads: ‘We, of course, look forward to receiving pictures of Borden products in use – primarily by the natives.’

In fact, there was a symbiotic relationship between the expedition and the American companies – with the firms deciding to underwrite part of the travels while entrusting the expedition party with the task of marketing their brands. There is little doubt that the businesses found in Davis a cheaper alternative source of publicity for their products in
faraway places. This is best shown in a correspondence between the Bridgeport Brass Company and Davis: ‘We appreciate your taking our products on your expedition and will be looking forward to reports from you from time to time about their effectiveness in the tropics.’ This line of thinking was shared by the Lederle Laboratories Division, a company involved in the manufacture of medical products. In supplying the Davis Expedition with drugs and health products, the firm’s point person requested that ‘if you have any pictures which show some spectacular chieftain or colorful local belle, give me the story on it and

Figure 2. Selling Low-Tech Modernity.
The blurb accompanying the picture in Sorcerers’ Village reads: “Hassoldt Davis and Ernie the Chimp in multiple publicity scene: Lambretta Scooter, Borden’s Klim, Eastman’s Medallist camera, Tupperware.” Photo courtesy of the Human Studies Film, Archives & National Anthropological Archives (Suitland, MD).
we might get it into the press.’ The only requirement that Lederle Labs had was that ‘inas-
much as we must always be very accurate in the medical information that we send out, and also very ethical, a doctor be present in any picture showing the actual administration of a drug, whenever possible.’

These correspondences and other exchanges show that Davis was operating on behalf of some important US business interests, including Bell & Howell Company, Sawyer’s inc., Polaroid Corporation, the Tupper Corporation and the Quaker Oats Company. An inveterate explorer and a critic of the American materialistic ethos, Davis was nonetheless the representative of a culture that created in him only revulsion. In this role as a salesperson of corporate America (Figure 2), both at home and abroad, he served the interests of those big companies (cf. Borden, Eastman, Tupper) that were doggedly in search of new lands to bring into the fold of the American Century. Anthropologist Alison J. Clarke has demonstrated a similar point convincingly in her discussion of the 1950s promotional campaigns of Tupperware artifacts in which Hassoldt Davis was the focal attraction. In 1954, indeed, Davis was contracted to appear in the pages of Tupperware Sparks – the in-house magazine of the Tupperware company. There he ‘enacted in a bizarre scene of commodity imperialism [that] far exceeded Earl Tupper’s modest vision of the total “Tupperization” of North American homes, by introducing Tupperware to an African nomadic tribe’. In terms of design, the ad substituted the ‘traditional ritual palm-sapping and blood letting vessels’ of the African natives ‘with Econo-Canisters and Wonder Bowls, Tupperware [which Davis] boasted, “had been through the roughest treatment the natives could subject it to,” including the use [of one] canister as a container for “magic” witch-craft powder’.

We definitely do not know how many American products the Davis Expedition brought to Ivory Coast. But as the exploration party crisscrossed the territory from South to North and East to West, the Davises always made sure that they left behind a ‘heap of grateful presents’ for the native peoples. The complexity of the ‘social life’ that consumer products may assume in a society does not allow gauging the reception of Davis’s ‘grateful presents’ among the local people, especially so since we understand, following the insight of Igor Kopytoff, that ‘the same thing may, at the same time, be seen as a commodity by one person and as something else by another’. In fact, as in so many instances of cultural contacts, the consumer products ‘can show what anthropologists have so often stressed: that what is significant about the adoption of alien objects – as of alien ideas – is not the fact that they are adopted, but the way they are culturally redefined and put to use’.

These complexities of the cultural biographies of things put aside, if one should rely on Davis’s own account, it seems that the local populations not only liked the gifts left by the Americans but also actively sought them. Thus, as he opened the Ivorian territory to the ‘imperial eyes’ of the United States, Hassoldt Davis was also subtly paving the way for the projection of American soft power and the market-driven consumer culture that it diligently conveyed. In this vein, his work hardly differed from the one carried out by earlier American internationalists and global travelers in their efforts to spread the American dream.

Archival materials bear witness to this argument. Even before Davis’s expedition to Ivory Coast, American firms had been trying to tap the various markets of France’s African colonies. In a report written toward the end of the Second World War, for instance, French colonial authorities observed that American businesses were ‘considering the exploitation
of the commercial markets located in our possessions of West and Equatorial Africa. This was happening within the context of increased commercial relations between US traders and French West Africa. Indeed, Ivorian cocoa beans had found their way to Great Britain and the United States throughout the war years. As the conflict came to a close, tropical wood from France’s African colonies (Ivory Coast and Gabon in particular) came to supplement the now diverse agricultural products that supplied the American market.

While contemporary accounts specifically emphasized American interest in the exploitation of rubber, peanuts and other agricultural raw materials, it was also the case that many American businesses were developing an interest in the booming infrastructural markets that French West Africa offered. Already in 1941, RCA Communications had opened a radiotelegraph circuit that was to link the United States to various cities in French Africa. Illustrating a similar US interest, if obliquely, was an unsuccessful bid on behalf of the American constructor Raymond Concrete Pile in 1946 to finish the construction of the Abidjan port facilities. However, given French fears of American encroachment, the offer did not go through.

Such setback did not deter the proponents of the expansion of US market share in the territory. With the completion of the port of Abidjan in 1951, American trading activities with the territory became aggressive and quite dynamic – a situation that the Export and Import Bureau of the Baltimore Association of Commerce had projected, prompting the entrepreneurial trade group to inaugurate a regular shipping route to Ivory Coast. While the Ivorian market progressively closed to the importation of American cigarette and tobacco, there was an increase in the demand of other US merchandises, including dairy products, chemicals, metallic wares and other technoscientific commodities such as frames, grinders/crushers, spare parts and insecticides.

Even more important for the project of expanding the reach of the American informal empire in Ivory Coast was the increasing Ivorian share in the overall US export to French West Africa. From a share of 17 percent in 1947, the Ivorian market came to absorb more than 40 percent of American exports to the region by the middle of the 1950s. This was a remarkable development in US–West African commercial relations, especially since Ivory Coast remained demographically among the smaller markets of France’s empire in West Africa. But what the territory lacked in population, it easily compensated it with the relatively higher purchasing power of its residents, including the ever increasing metropolitan urban elite and the African planter class who now enjoyed improved purchasing powers thanks to the rising prices of coffee and cocoa.

Evidently, in proposing the request to open an American consulate in Abidjan in the summer of 1950, Consul General Perry N. Jester had these developments in mind. Writing to the State Department, he had noted that the Ivorian capital was ‘emerging as the great commercial city and as the great center of activity of all kinds on the Gulf of Guinea’. Given this reality, American economic interests had to be represented, especially since the opening of the Vridi Canal was expected to ‘cause a drastic reorientation of shipping, transportation, and communication in French West Africa’. Anticipating such reorientation, and regardless of the diplomatic setback they had met at the beginning of the decade, US diplomats continued to press for the opening of a consulate in Ivory Coast. In 1955, Washington reiterated its request to the French authorities. Although Paris acquiesced this time, a lack of adequate funding prevented the Department of State from setting up its second legation in French West Africa. A new request was introduced the following year in the
midst of a new bout of American paranoia over communist activities in Africa.\(^92\) It was this request of 1956 that resulted in the opening of the American consulate in Abidjan and the appointment of Parke Duncan Massey as its first officer in 1957. Thus, by the time of Ivorian independence was proclaimed in 1960, not only had Ivory Coast become safe for capitalism, but it seemed that the country had been brought successfully into the fold to the *Pax Americana*.\(^93\)

**Conclusion**

It would be an understatement to claim that the emerging scholarship on US involvement in postwar African affairs has the potential to retool the larger historiography of American foreign relations in the twentieth-century. With its focus on America’s relations with late colonial Ivory Coast, this article has aimed to contribute to this agenda. In particular, it has highlighted the fractal character of policy-making in a world dominated by Cold War activism, anticolonial nationalism and the American Century. I have argued that in the liminal world of decolonization, the globalization of the American capitalist modernity operated as a subtle critique of the civilizing missions of the European colonial powers. Indeed, as the saga surrounding the US request to open a consulate in Abidjan demonstrated, there was more than a drive to checkmate the Soviets in the emerging Third World. Rhetorically, American diplomats may have used the language of the Cold War and the threat of Soviet infiltration to sell their policies, but their actions bespoke of the old vision of a market-driven informal imperialism and the projection of American soft power. This would become even clearer in the late 1950s and 1960s as a number of US companies challenged and sometimes outbid French firms in the competition for development expertise in Ivory Coast.\(^94\) As historian Martin Thomas has suggested then, it was not simply the diplomats in Washington who single-handedly decided on the posture to adopt vis-à-vis a post-1945 world that was shedding off the yoke of traditional space-based imperialism. Instead, there were other constituencies, including ‘the US consular service […] and the network of American business interests’, both of which labored tirelessly in an effort to establish an American informal empire in Africa.\(^95\)

A critical analysis of the work of Hassoldt Davis along with a close scrutiny of his interactions with the people of Ivory Coast lends support to the point that the American way of empire was relatively novel since it indeed ‘inaugurated the system of annexing wealth, apart from inhabitants or territories, disdaining outward shows in order to arrive at the essentials of domination without a dead-weight of areas to administer and multitudes to govern’.\(^96\) Of course, Davis did not stay long enough to see how, in the context of the Cold War, the United States effectively, if unevenly, reached these ‘essentials of domination’ in Ivory Coast without a physical presence of its army or even the appointment of a permanent diplomatic corps. In fact, by the time the first American consul arrived in Abidjan in 1957, the explorer had returned to the United States. Back home, his whims became ever more eccentric. Increasingly alcoholic, he ended up forcing Ruth to seek divorce; which she did in the closing years of the decade and went back to Africa, where she opened an art gallery. Lonely, Davis only found solace in hard liquor, ‘now drinking more or less all the time’, as Millman reveals in his introduction to a new edition of Davis’s *The Jungle & the Damned*. In 1959, this descent into alcoholism sent the unusual American cold warrior to his grave.\(^97\)
Despite its rather cheerless ending, the story of Hassoldt Davis, like those of many other American liberals in the Third World, provides a window to appreciate in close-up the drama of US Cold War activism and its entanglement with deliberate attempts to expand the realm of consumer capitalism. In fact, it magnifies the way(s) in which the mobilization of ‘everyday technology’ contributed to US imperial outreach. In the era of Sputnik and nuclear arm race, to be sure, the United States deployed highly sophisticated technologies to wage the battle against its Soviet rival, especially during the proxy wars of the global Cold War. But those instances may actually have been the proverbial exceptions that confirmed the rule of American presence in the world. At a time when Soviet technological breakthroughs were demonstrating that communism could equally lead to high-modernity, it was the low-tech machines and gadgets that seemingly convinced those ‘wretched of the earth’ inhabiting on the margins of the Cold War’s hot spots that American know-how was ‘mightier than Marx’. This makes Davis’s odyssey in late colonial Ivory Coast all the more remarkable because it reveals that American technological artifacts, especially in the form of small-scale machines, were seen as a powerful way to exhibit and project American power.

Notes

3. The exception to the exclusion of Francophone sub-Saharan Africa has been the Congo. See for instance, John Kent, America, the UN and Decolonisation: Cold War Conflict in the Congo (London & New York: Routledge, 2010); David N. Gibbs, The Political Economy of Third World Intervention: Mines, Money, and U.S. Policy in the Congo Crisis (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Madeleine G. Kalb, The Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa, from Eisenhower to Kennedy (New York: Macmillan, 1982). There is, however, a new crop of work that is expanding the analysis to


5. For the cinematic version of the couple’s travel, see Harry Tschopik and Hassoldt Davis (dirs.), *Primitive Strikes Back* (New York: American Museum of Natural History/CBS, 1954). See also Hassoldt Davis (dir.), *Sorcerers’ Village* (New York: Film Representations, 1958). For the written account of the trip, see Hassoldt Davis, *Sorcerers’ Village* (New York: Suell, Sloan & Pearce, 1955). The Davises also took hundreds of pictures, some of which were sold to private companies or donated to research institutions. For a sample of the pictures, see 94-08 Hassoldt Davis Collection, West Africa (Ivory Coast) Expedition, 1948-1954, boxes 17–19, Human Studies Film Archives & National Anthropological Archives (Suitland, MD, hereafter HSFA).


9. In fact, Davis’s informant used the phrase in reference of indigenous magic. But later, Davis appropriated the idea as he schemed to demonstrate the superiority of American technosciencce, that is, the ‘White Man’s magic’. For details, see Davis, *Sorcerers’ Village*, 31, 271–4, 325.


23. Roy Chapman, ‘The Death of a King’, New York Times, 29 May 1955, 196. Ruth disagreed with many of the analyses that Hassoldt Davis offered in his travelogue. For this reason, she did not endorse the publication of the opus. For details on this point, see Ruth Davis to H. Davis, 5 June 1953, 94–08 Hassoldt Davis Collection, Correspondence, 1923–1959, box 35, HSFA.

24. Davis, Sorcerers’ Village, ix–x.


27. Davis, Sorcerers’ Village, 33.


29. Davis, Sorcerers’ Village, 35.


34. Davis, Sorcerers’ Village, 10.


37. For the first-hand accounts of the American travelers who visited Ivory Coast before the Second World War, see William B. Seabrook, Jungle Ways (New York: Blue Ribbon Books, 1931); Katherine Edmondson Seabrook, Gao of the Ivory Coast (New York: Coward-McCann, 1931).

38. For more on these changes, see Cooper, Citizenship between Empire and Nation; Ruth Schachter Morgenthau, Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964); Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, French West Africa (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1958).


42. Chafer, End of Empire in French West Africa, 104. For the notion that the French authorities were paranoid, see Keese, ‘Culture of Panic’, 137–8.


44. Dakar to Washington, 3 Jan. 1948, RG 84, Senegal/Dakar Consulate General, box 1, National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, Maryland, hereafter USNA).
45. ‘Activities of the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain’ [Information Report], 23 May 1949, CIA-RDP79-01090A00010003019-8, CIA Records Search Tool (hereafter CREST), USNA.
50. For more on this role of the media which I have analyzed elsewhere as ‘performative’ reporting, see Abou B. Bamba, ‘Transnationalising Decolonisation: The Print Media, American Public Spheres, and France’s Imperial Exit in West Africa’, Journal of Transatlantic Studies, xi (2013), 327–49.
52. Dakar to Paris [Incoming Telegram], 2 May 1951, série: Afrique-Levant (AL) 1944-1952/sous-série: Afrique Occidentale Française (AOF), Carton 4, Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères (Paris/France, hereafter, AMAE); Dakar to Paris [Incoming Telegram], 30 April 1951, AL/AOF, Carton 4, AMAE.
54. Dakar to Washington, 11 April 1950, William Moreland Papers, box 4, Hoover Institution Archives (Palo Alto, California, hereafter HIA); Dakar to Washington, 3 March 1949, RG 84, Senegal/Dakar Consulate General, box 4, USNA.
55. Central Intelligence Agency, ‘Communism in Africa’ [Intelligence Memo], 24 Jan. 1951, CIA-RDP79T00935A000100060001-7, CREST, USNA; Dakar to Washington, 17 Dec. 1951, RG 84, Senegal/Dakar Consulate General, box 6, USNA.
56. Dakar to Washington, 26 Oct. 1950, RG 84, Senegal/Dakar Consulate General, box 5, USNA.
58. Dakar to Washington, 2 Aug. 1950, William Moreland Papers, box 4, HIA.


66. Davis, Sorcerers’ Village, 23.


68. Davis, Sorcerers’ Village, 35.

69. Davis, Sorcerers’ Village, 273.

70. Davis, Sorcerers’ Village, 273.

71. Davis, Sorcerers’ Village, 273.

72. Davis, Sorcerers’ Village, 327. For a list of companies that contributed to the expedition, see ‘Products Donated to Expedition’, nd, 94-08 Hassoldt Davis Collection, West Africa (Ivory Coast) Expedition, 1948-1954, box 21, HSFA.


75. Karl E. Jensen [Lederle Laboratories Division] to H. Davis, 23 June 1950, 94-08 Hassoldt Davis Collection, West Africa (Ivory Coast) Expedition, 1948-1954, box 21, HSFA.

76. Rupert Leach [Sawyer’s Inc.] to H. Davis, 18 May 1951, 94-08 Hassoldt Davis Collection, Correspondence, 1923-1959, box 35, HSFA; Bell & Howell Company to H. Davis, 17 Jan. 1951, 94-08 Hassoldt Davis Collection, West Africa (Ivory Coast) Expedition, 1948-1954, box 21, HSFA; Richard T. Kriebel [Polaroid Corporation] to H. Davis, 2 June 1950, 94-08 Hassoldt Davis Collection, West Africa (Ivory Coast) Expedition, 1948-1954, box 21, HSFA; John C. Healy [Tupper Corporation] to H. Davis, 2 Sep.1949, 94-08 Hassoldt Davis Collection, West Africa (Ivory Coast) Expedition, 1948-1954, box 21, HSFA; Quaker Oats Company to H. Davis, 17 June 1949, 94-08 Hassoldt Davis Collection, West Africa (Ivory Coast) Expedition, 1948-1954, box 21, HSFA.

77. Alison J. Clarke. “‘Parties Are the Answer’: Gender, Modernity and Material Culture’, UCLA Historical Journal, xiv (1994), 168. This was not the first time there was such collision between explorers, commercial interests and capitalist modernity. For details, see Gérard Leclerc, Anthropologie et colonialisme: Essai sur l’histoire de l’africanisme (Paris: Fayard, 1972), 15–23.

78. Davis, Sorcerers’ Village, 333.


82. For elaboration on these earlier episodes, see Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream; and Domash, American Commodities.

83. ‘Note sur les colonies françaises de l’ouest africain et le monde américain des affaires’, 25 Aug 1945, AL/ AOF, Carton 6, AMAE.

87. Chargé d’Affaire (Monrovia) to André Schock, 27 Aug. 1946, AL/ AOF, Carton 6, AMAE; Chargé d’Affaire (Monrovia) to Ministre de la France d’Outre-Mer, 3 Sept. 1946, AL/ AOF, Carton 6, AMAE; Secrétaire d’État de la France d’Outre-Mer to Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, 6 Oct. 1948, AL/ AOF, Carton 6, AMAE; Incoming Telegram, 20 Jan. 1949, AL/ AOF, Carton 6, AMAE.
91. Perry N. Jester [Dakar] to Washington, 6 June 1950, William Moreland Papers, box 5, HIA.